



# RULED BY VIOLENCE

June 2020

An Analysis of the Nature,  
Patterns and Execution of  
Violence in Zimbabwe  
since 1998



Zimbabwe  
**HUMAN RIGHTS**  
NGO Forum

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**June 2020**

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The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum

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## About The Forum and CSU

The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (the Forum) is a coalition of 20 human rights organisations working towards the realisation of a society that respects all human rights in Zimbabwe.

The CSU is an organisation with a vision to eliminate fear and build courage in order to build a democratic and torture free Zimbabwe.

## Members Of The Forum

- Amnesty International-Zimbabwe (AI- Z)
- Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace - Zimbabwe (CCJP- Z)
- Civic Education Network (CIVNET)
- Counselling Services Unit (CSU)
- Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ)
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- Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR)
- Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP)
- Zimbabwe Women Lawyers Association (ZWLA)

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## Abbreviations and Acronyms

CCJPZ	Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe
CIO	Central Intelligence Organization
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
CSU	Counseling Services Unit
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DRCs	Democratic Resistance Committees
GAPWUZ	General Agricultural and Plantation Workers Union of Zimbabwe
GNU	Government of National Unity
JOC	Joint Operations Command
LRF	Legal Resources Foundation
ICTs	Information and Communication Technologies
ILO	International Labour Organization
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MDC-A	Movement for Democratic Change- Alliance
MDC- T	Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai
NCA	National Constitutional Assembly
NYU	New York University
OSISA	Open Society in Southern Africa
OVT	Organized Violence and Torture
SADC	Southern African Development Community
UN	United Nations
WOZA	Women of Zimbabwe Arise
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
ZCTU	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
ZHR NGO Forum	Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum
ZINASU	Zimbabwe National Students Union
ZPP	Zimbabwe Peace Project

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## Executive Summary

Zimbabwe has experienced traumatic conflicts during the past six decades. The conflicts have ranged from nationalist resistance in the 1960s and a protracted liberation struggle in the 1970s to a civil war in the western provinces in the 1980s. Most of the conflicts have revolved around power struggles and identity issues. Following a brief lull in the early 1990s, the country has since then lurched from crisis to crisis.

It is not an exaggeration to state that both colonial and post-colonial violence has left a large residue of wounds, trauma and unsavory memories in Zimbabwean society. Unfortunately, the state and society have not addressed the historical and contemporary consequences of those wounds, scars and resultant trauma. There have been no earnest and systematic attempts to heal those festering wounds. The cycles of conflict, including violence, tend to be repeated.

This report explores the context, causes and patterns of politically related violence during the two decades from 1998 to 2019. The first decade opened with violence unleashed during the suppression of food riots in 1998. The second decade closed with post-election killings in 2018 and repression of strikers and demonstrators during the 2019 shutdown.

The report begins by setting out the broad context in which violence has been perpetrated during the two decades. A full understanding of this context enables one to avoid a superficial analysis of the structures and processes that beget violence. Central to these is a Zimbabwean state that is an amalgam of inherited colonial state structures as well as liberation movement and party-state features in which the military has become a dominant force. The drift towards a militarized state is explained as one of the factors that have made the use of force in politics a recurrent dangerous feature.

The core of this report consists of an examination of the main forms and patterns of political violence during the period from 1998 to 2019. This coincides with the period in which the ZHR NGO Forum has been active in systematically gathering data on human rights abuses including political violence. The third and fourth chapters provide considerable detail on specific forms of violence:

- Torture
- Rape and
- Abduction

Examples of patterns of these forms of violence are drawn from trends in inter-party and intra-party violence and state-related violence. The peaks of the violence tend to occur during elections that are taken as “*do or die affairs*” in a zero-sum approach to political



competition. They also recur in conditions of strikes and demonstrations during periods of economic austerity. However, another growing trend is violence that explodes during conflicts over increasingly scarce resources.

Victims of violence rarely receive justice, compensation, and healing while those who inflict the violence often enjoy impunity. The concluding chapter argues the imperative to break the cycles of violence and makes specific recommendations to do the following:

- Build and update a national database of human rights violations.
- Implement election-related reforms.
- Develop a holistic approach to resource conflicts.
- Address the vulnerabilities of women and youth.
- Improve access to justice and compensation and end the culture of impunity.
- Execute reforms in the security sector.
- Ensure access to counseling, treatment, and rehabilitation.
- Search for a broad-based political settlement through a national inclusive dialogue.



# INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

The Zimbabwean society has experienced many layers of conflict and violence since the attainment of independence 40 years ago. These layers were added on to those that had accumulated during the earlier colonial and liberation struggle eras. Up to 60 000 lives were lost during the liberation struggle, and about 20 000 during the Gukurahundi pogrom. Colonial and post-colonial violence has thus left a large residue of wounds, trauma, and unsavory memories in Zimbabwean society. Unfortunately, the state and society have not addressed the historical and contemporary consequences of those wounds, scars, and resultant trauma. Both before and after Independence, there have been no earnest and systematic measures to heal those festering wounds. Cycles of violence have been accompanied by the impunity that has fostered repeated aggression and abuse.

**60 000**

Lives lost during  
Liberation Struggle

**20 000**

Lives lost during  
Gukurahundi Pogrom

## 1.1 Context

This Report explores the context, causes and patterns of politically related violence during the two decades from 1998 to 2019. After a relatively peaceful interregnum of the late 1980s to the late 1990s, political violence reared its ugly head particularly from 2000. However, it is significant that the decades begin with military shootings of food rioters in 1998 and closes with the post-election shootings of August 2018, and killings of civilians during the January 2019 shutdown.

The Report begins by spelling out the broad context in which violence has been perpetrated during the two decades. A full understanding of this context enables one to avoid a superficial analysis of the structures and processes that beget violence. Central to these is a Zimbabwean state that is an amalgam of inherited colonial state structures as well as party-state features in which the military has become a dominant force. The drift towards a militarized state is explained as one of the factors that have made the use of force in politics a recurrent dangerous feature.

## 1.2 Outline of the Report

The core of this Report consists of the examination (in chapters 3 and 4) of different forms and dynamics of violence as they have evolved. Particular focus is made on conflicts between parties, especially during election campaigns. Because elections are viewed as 'do or die affairs' from a zero-sum context, political temperatures rise to a high-level during campaigns. During the decades under review, it was no accident that peaks in violent clashes occurred during election years such as 2000, 2002, 2008 and 2018.

In addition, the Report also observes disturbing trends in internal party violence that again reaches a peak during primary elections. Major parties like ZANU-PF and the MDC, and its later offshoots of MDC-T and MDC-Alliance have been arenas of this intra-party violence. Factionalism in parties has also been another cause of outbreaks of violence. Overall, however, intra-party violence has not reached the scale of the inter-party clashes.

In Chapter 3, the Report delves into greater detail on various types of violence primarily torture, rape and abductions. There is a notable increase in the systematic use of torture largely against the opposition in 2002 and 2008 but also against activists in civil society organizations (CSOs). One of the most notorious uses of torture were the beatings in 2007 of the leaders of the 'Save Zimbabwe Campaign', that followed on the heels of ferocious torture of trade unionists in 2006.



The calculated use of rape against political opponents is then put under the spotlight. Ominously, rape is used as a retaliatory weapon largely against women but also men in opposition parties. It is very distressing that authorities in positions of power reportedly committed some of the rape. Another method used against opposition and CSO activists has been abduction whose incidence soared in 2008 and 2019. These forms of violence have been recurrent over the two decades largely because of the impunity enjoyed by the perpetrators. There has been no justice and healing for the victims. The Report explains why the cycles of violence accompanied by these practices continue to recur.

### 1.3 Role of State Institutions

The Report pays special attention to the response of state institutions (police, military and intelligence) to this spiral of violence. Lacking impartiality, there has been no confidence that they can be even-handed in cases of inter-party conflicts. Their heavy-handed response to protests, strikes and demonstrations by opposition parties is proverbial. The institutions are viewed as part of the party-state apparatus dominated by ZANU-PF.

The scramble for power is not the only major factor behind the violence. Conflicts over resources such as land and minerals also often spill into violence.

Chapter 4 explains the roots of these conflicts over resources, and how they have become increasingly politicized in recent years. It elaborates on how casualties have increased with the proliferation of mining gangs like the *MaShurugwi*<sup>1</sup> who have become a national, social and political risk. There has been a mutation of different forms of violence from earlier predominantly political forms. The intertwining of economic and political violence is very toxic.

### 1.4 Recommendations

Chapter 5 consists of a Conclusion and Recommendations to address both the causes and consequences of violence. They necessarily have to be multi-pronged responses to the scourge. The cycles of violence must be broken. The recommendations relate to:

- Building and updating a database.
- Election-related reforms.
- A holistic approach to resource conflicts.
- Addressing the vulnerabilities of women and youth.
- Impunity, justice, and compensation issues.
- Security sector and policing reforms.
- Counseling, treatment, and rehabilitation.
- Search for a broad-based political settlement

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1. *MaShurugwi* is a derisive term that refers to small miners' gangs that exploit mining claims using force and other unlawful means. The term has been extended to describe mining gangs operating in other parts of the country beyond Shurugwi in the Midlands.

## CONTEXT OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND VIOLENCE

Zimbabwe experiences cycles of politically motivated violence as observed in the introductory chapter. The cycles often peak during elections and economic crises. Ever since 1980, the peaks of violence can be traced to these periods and the troughs to the periods between. Except for the Gukurahundi era violence that lasted for a continuous period from 1982 to 1987, election years and economic austerity periods have generated most cycles of violence. This study explores the causes, features and dynamics of this violence particularly from 1998 to 2019. Covering two decades of these phenomena enables one to identify triggers, patterns and consequences of this scourge.



### 2.1 Roots of Violence

Violence in the post-1980 period is inseparable from its roots in the colonial state and liberation struggle eras. Some studies have argued that these roots thrive in a culture of hate, impunity and insatiable power, a culture that remains embedded in our political system.<sup>2</sup> It was not, therefore, an aberration for violence to occur in the 1985 and 1990 elections since the governing ZANU-PF party sought to consolidate its rule. The pattern was confirmed and reinforced during the

more tightly contested elections of 2000, 2002, 2008 and 2018. Violence triggered by protests against economic hardships forms another clear trajectory or cycle during the period under study. Acute austerity pushed thousands of citizens to protest against high inflation and astronomical prices leading to food riots in 1998. During the decade of hyperinflation and contraction from 1998 to 2008, there were strikes and clashes between unions and state agencies. Repression including

2. See for example Ranger et.al. 2000; Kaulemu, 2004; Masunungure, 2009 and Sachikonye, 2011. – Need to use same font style as main text for all footnotes.



state violence was directed towards trade unions and protesters in 2005 and 2006, and during attempted shutdowns in 2016 and 2019. Economic downturns have been a recurrent process under ZANU-PF; a source of its weakness and unpopularity, they have generated popular protests that have provoked further repression.

An example of repressive state response was *Operation Restore Order or Murambatsvina* in 2005 that had a twin objective of crippling the opposition's urban base and cleaning up the informal economy. The military-style Operation had a devastating socio-economic and displacement impact whose effects are still felt today.

The observation of this study is that political violence should not be viewed in isolation from what might be termed economic violence. The latter includes effects of deteriorating living conditions like poverty, hunger, unemployment, and lack of basic health care. The two decades from 1998 to 2019 have experienced these intersections between political and economic crises resulting in protests, riots and draconian state response that surged into violence.

Economic violence can subsequently take the form of political violence. Although some media obscure the symbiotic connection between the two, clearly discontent with deteriorating conditions sparks demonstrations that can morph into riots. State violence is then used to repress the protests and riots.

## 2.2 Features of the Zimbabwean State

What are the features of the Zimbabwean State itself? Having observed that the above factors are the key triggers of violence, this question is important because it has a direct bearing on how the state regulates governance processes like elections, and how it responds to the economic crisis. The Zimbabwean state is a combination of the inherited colonial state apparatus, the structures set up at independence, and the fusion of these structures with the governing ZANU-PF party.

The party is deeply embedded into the state partly through recruitment and promotion practices, and partly through the use of state resources for its strategic advantage. This is an instance of 'state capture' by the governing party. This means that the state is not an impartial referee in governance, electoral and economic matters. The Zimbabwean state is inherently biased towards the interests of the governing ZANU-PF party in various spheres including in the conduct of elections, and the management of the economy.

While it was common to describe the inherited state as a 'police state' given its repressive tendencies and use of Emergency Powers in the initial decades of post-independence rule, there has been an evolution towards what may be termed a 'military state'. Other analysts have described it as a '*securocratic*' state, a state



in which the military and security apparatus is a dominant factor in the power complex.<sup>3</sup> According to this perspective, Zimbabwe's 'securocracy' has its origins in the liberation struggle era in which the military-security complex reigned supreme over civil and political structures and relations.<sup>4</sup> Under Robert Mugabe, the military-security factor since 2000 sought to pervade wider social and political relations, compromise or contradict public policy issues, subvert the electoral system and purge political rivals to the incumbent 'Big Man'.<sup>5</sup> The party-state thus increasingly acquired features and orientation of a 'military state'.

In this state, some structures are more powerful than others. Such is the case with the Joint Operations Command (JOC), a relic structure from the colonial era, whose profile grew significantly in the post-2000 period. According to a former Cabinet Minister, the JOC, not Cabinet nor the politburo, is the pivotal authority in Zimbabwe:

*"yet JOC is not a statutory or constitutional entity. JOC is the center of state power in Zimbabwe. It is the system. JOC's pivotal role is particularly pronounced during elections. This is because of the obvious reason that elections are strategically important for deciding who gets into power, or stays in power, or gets out of power, when and how..."*<sup>6</sup>

Overshadowing that of Cabinet, the central role of JOC in political and economic affairs has also been confirmed by other institutions.<sup>7</sup> The secretive body was mooted to have planned *Operation Murambatsvina* (in 2005), and the revival of Mugabe's political fortunes through *Operation Makavoterapapi* after his electoral loss in the first round of the 2008 election. Other notable military-style operations included *Operation Hakudzokwi* in 2008 at the Marange diamond mines resulting in considerable loss of life.

3. Ibbo Mandaza, 2015:11

4. *ibid.*

5. *ibid.* See also Jabusile Shumba, 2018

6. See Jonathan Moyo, 2019:28

7. UNDP, 2008

## 2.3 Drift towards a ‘Militarized’ State

The drift towards a ‘military state’ was confirmed by the 2017 coup that toppled Robert Mugabe and installed Emmerson Mnangagwa as President. Despite official denials that it was a coup, there was little doubt that senior military officers executed it. Some of the officers went on to become leading members of the post-coup Cabinet and Presidium. The process of militarization that became pronounced from 1998 reached its high point in the post-coup period.<sup>8</sup> For instance, with one of the generals having been appointed vice-president in 2017, the military was now just a heartbeat away from the highest office in the land. Most accounts of the coup elaborate on how the military neutralized potential resistance from other security organs of the state such as the Police and Central Intelligence Organization (CIO).<sup>9</sup>

However, the construction of a ‘military state’ can be traced back to 1998 when two seminal events occurred: firstly, the military intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to shore up the Laurent Kabila regime, and secondly the repression unleashed during the food riots. Both events occurred in 1998. Particularly noteworthy in its policing support to the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) was the military’s unprecedented brutality that included shootings of

protesters. Thereafter the military was active in post-2000 land invasions that were violent at times and was implicated in intimidation of voters, notably in the 2008 run-off presidential election. The orientation and ambition of the military leadership were also revealed in its publicly stated position during the 2002 presidential election campaign that it would not honor or recognize the election of a political leader who did not have liberation war credentials.<sup>10</sup>

“ The process of militarization that became pronounced from 1998 reached its high point in the post-coup period.

Some analysts view 2008 as the turning point for the military. Having restored Mugabe’s fortunes through campaigning and violence, the military proved to have the capacity to be a king maker, and potentially to become ‘king’ itself in the future.<sup>11</sup> Of huge significance was that the military was not a neutral and professional actor as stipulated by the 2013 Constitution.<sup>12</sup> It viewed itself as the key foundation stone of the party-state, and a player in any political succession. This self-conscious and self-interested mission of the military distinguishes it from that of its counterparts in neighboring countries that also underwent liberation struggles:

8. See Blessing-Miles Tendi's article, 2019

9. *ibid.*

10. Statement by General Zvinvashe, ZDF Commander, Harare, 9 January 2002

11. See Tendi, 2019, and Mandaza, 2015

12. Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013



Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa. However, it is a mission that poses some challenges. The capacity and credibility of Zimbabwe's military to steer the state progressively in political and economic matters is questionable. The question raises the issue of its methodology of governance, particularly its tendency or predilection to resort to force where mediation and compromise are necessary.

## 2.4 Key Literature on Violence and Society

We cannot conclude this section of the study without acknowledging important contributions that have been made to knowledge about the origins, patterns and consequences of violence in Zimbabwean society. Some contributions are in the form of historical studies of phases of violence such as during the liberation struggle. These include reports by CCJPZ on military brutalities against civilians in the 1970s; studies by Norma Kriger on violence meted out to civilians by guerillas, and reports by CCJPZ and LRF on the Gukurahundi pogrom.<sup>13</sup> Other notable contributions are by Ranger, Alexander and McGregor whose book traces how devastating post-colonial violence has shaped the collective memory of the peoples of Matabeleland while Doran's account explores the sources of conflict that culminated in the Gukurahundi pogrom in 1983 and 1984.<sup>14</sup>

However, for a systematic and in-depth reporting on violence and other human rights violations we depend on the ZHR NGO Forum whose regular reports since 1998 have provided not only valuable information but also a gold standard of such reporting for other organizations. In the same mold, periodic reports on human rights violations by the Zimbabwe Peace Project, Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, Heal Zimbabwe Trust amongst others have been vital in building a clear picture of trends in violence and other human rights violations. The UN report on *Operation Murambatsvina* of 2005 is a compelling account of economic violence and its wider effects.

Analytical studies that explore the patterns and consequences of violence include those by Eldred Masunungure who focused on patterns of state-sponsored violence that was systematically used against the opposition MDC-T party after the first round of the 2008 election; and by Lloyd Sachikonye on the connections between institutionalized violence of the colonial and post-colonial eras and their wide ramifications for present-day political culture and society.<sup>15</sup> Studies on the military state include those by Jabusile Shumba who explores how it has also become a '*predatory state*' or '*securocratic state*' as Mandaza put it.<sup>16</sup>

13. See CCJP and LRF, 1997; Richard Werbner, 1995; Norma Kriger, 1992;

14. Terence Ranger et.al. 2000; Stuart Doran, 2016.

15. Eldred Masunungure, 2009; Lloyd Sachikonye, 2011

16. Shumba, 2018; Mandaza, 2015.



The intersection between corruption in natural resource exploitation and violence is vividly shown in conflicts in the mining sector, particularly diamonds in Marange in 2008 to 2009.<sup>17</sup> For instance, clashes between small miners and the security agencies and military left an estimated 200 dead in 2008.

One of the few penetrating studies on how the rigging of the electoral system has been conducted and its ramifications in violence is that by Jonathan Moyo in 2019.<sup>18</sup> Although a partisan account, the book bears the hallmarks of an insider who was also an election strategist during his career in ZANU-PF.

Finally, the valuable first-hand accounts of abduction and torture at the hands of security organs include those by Raymond

Choto in 1999 and Jestina Mukoko in 2016.<sup>19</sup> The accounts are vivid and compelling.

For a society in which violence has loomed large in its politics, it is surprising that state-related studies and commissions of enquiry have been conspicuous by their absence. It is as if discourse and evidence on violence is taboo and embarrassing. For example, the Chihambakwe Commission report in the mid-1980s on Gukurahundi terror did not see the light of the day. There was a split on opinion within the Church on whether and when to release the report on *'Breaking the Silence'* on Gukurahundi findings.

Significant and influential reports on violence during the period under review have included the UN report on Operation Restore/ Murambatsvina of 2005 and Motlanthe Commission report on the post-election violence in 2018.<sup>20</sup> The latter report is a rich source of material on how a state in which the military is the dominant element responds to protests against perceived election irregularities, and how the recourse to regular habits of *'trigger-happy'* responses leads to tragic loss of life. This body of literature on various dimensions of violence is growing. This is a positive development to the extent that public awareness of the tentacles of violence and the actors involved in it may contribute to measures against these recurrent cycles.

17. See Richard Saunders and Tinashe Nyamunda, 2016

18. Jonathan Moyo, 2019.

19. See Jestina Mukoko's riveting account on her abduction and torture

20. Motlanthe Report, 2018



## 2.5 Methodology

This report draws heavily from the database of the Counseling Services Unit. The Unit has been compiling data on organized violence and torture (OVT) since 1998. A specialized unit that serves victims of torture, political violence and rape, the CSU has an extensive primary material that it has built through its counseling of thousands of victims over the two decades. The strength of this Report derives from it is largely based on this unique hard evidence.

However, it is necessary to indicate that the CSU data is limited to areas of its operations that are Harare, Manicaland and the Mashonaland provinces. A more complete picture on OVT would require data from other provinces. Periodic data reports of the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum provided additional useful material. In addition to the CSU database, the Report has drawn from desk research including extensive literature that exists on human rights and political violence.

“ Significant and influential reports on violence during the period under review have included the UN report on Operation Restore/Murambatsvina of 2005 and Motlanthe Commission report on the post-election violence in 2018

## FORMS AND PATTERNS OF VIOLENCE

What have been the principal forms and patterns of violence during the period from 1998 to 2019? Drawing upon our conceptual framing (in Chapter 2) that stresses on the political dimension (election and power conflicts) the economic dimension (austerity, protests and strikes) and the linkages between these dimensions, we elaborate on forms and patterns throughout this chapter and the next one. The forms of violence that are explored are:

- Inter-party violence
- Torture
- Abduction
- State-related violence
- Intra-party violence
- Rape
- Repression of CSOs

The following sections draw on published material as well as on primary material that the Counseling Services Unit (CSU) has been accumulating over the years from its various counselling units mainly based in the Mashonaland and Manicaland regions. In addition, material gathered over the 21-year period by the ZHR NGO Forum is illuminating.



### 3.1 Inter-party Violence

Historically, most political violence has occurred between competing parties, especially during election campaigns. This tendency has continued before, during and after most elections. For example, in 2000 and 2002 about 30 and 60 opposition supporters were respectively killed during election campaigns. Since comprehensive dossiers on the violence covering the period between 1998 and 2018 already exist, we will mainly focus on constant patterns identified during this period.<sup>21</sup>

The main contestation has been between ZANU-PF and the MDC opposition movement before its subsequent splits beginning in 2005; founded in 1999, the latter was the most formidable opposition party since 1980. In 2000, violence by ZANU-PF supporters was mainly directed at MDC election contestants and organizers.<sup>22</sup> Features of violence included retribution against MDC supporters who testified in the many MDC election petitions that were brought before the High Court.

21. See the various reports of ZHR NGO Forum, 1998-2008; ZPP, 2008; SPT, 2003 and 2008)

22. This chapter partly draws from Sachikonye, 2011: 63-68 as well as from CSU material on this period.



In 2002, inter-party violence mainly orchestrated by ZANU-PF proliferated because of the presidential election of that year. There was a marked upsurge in the number of bases set for use by militia and war veterans for mobilization, torture and gang rape against opposition supporters. . Other specific actions against opposition supporters included the eviction by ZANU PF from their homes and several forms of violence against MDC polling agents and local council candidates to the extent that some got their identity documents destroyed and some withdrew from running in the elections.

In 2003, during the by-elections, there was an upsurge in inter-party violence in the form of abductions, detentions, and torture. Instances where MDC candidates were barred from entering Nomination Courts to file for election contests were recorded. In 2004, there was a marked trend towards raiding MDC offices and homes with police officers to ostensibly paralyze the operations of party.

Inter-party violence continued unabated between 2005 and 2007. For instance, there was eviction and displacement of MDC supporters in some areas in the build-up to the 2005 election particularly in Mashonaland West and Manicaland provinces. Harassment of opposition supporters included demands to produce ZANU-PF cards and bellicose threats from some leaders such as Saviour Kasukuwere

to get rid of '*MDC filth*'.<sup>23</sup>

A notable feature of the inter-party violence between 2002 and 2008 was the counter-violence orchestrated by the MDC. The counter-violence was retaliatory but on a relatively small and unsystematic scale. For instance, in 2002 there was retributive violence aimed at an alleged CIO agent, Joseph Mwale, who was allegedly implicated in the murder of Tichaona Chiminya and Talent Mabika of MDC during the 2000 election campaign. There were also reports of MDC youths assaulting ZANU-PF officials. In one instance, 200 youths destroyed a house in Glen View belonging to a ZANU-PF supporter.

Cases of counter-violence by MDC supporters continued in 2007 and 2008 although they remained limited in scale. There were reports of the formation of Democratic Resistance Committees (DRCs) in 2007 under the auspices of the MDC. These were essentially local self-defense bodies ostensibly formed to protect MDC members from attacks by ZANU-PF and state-linked agencies.

In sum, interparty violence has been overwhelmingly one-sided.<sup>24</sup> The phalanx of forces ranged against the MDC was more formidable because ZANU-PF coordinated its violence with various state agencies. The violence resulted in the loss of life and injury of persons on a far greater

23. See ZHR NGO Forum, May 2005:1

24. This section partly draws from Sachikonye, 2011:65.

greater scale than the violence perpetrated by the MDC. The latter was largely amateurish and limited in scale and mainly carried out by its youth members.

However, the disturbing features of counter-violence were an imitation of ZANU-PF methods of forcing people to chant party slogans, attacking members of the public wearing party T-shirts and gang raping of political opponents. Through the adoption of ZANU-PF methods, the MDC risked succumbing to a process of (for lack of an appropriate term) zanufication.

Interparty violence continued intermittently on a reduced scale in the post-2008 period. There were episodes of intimidation and clashes during the constitutional reform hearings in 2011 and 2012. However, there was a significant decline in inter-party violence in the 2013 and 2018 election campaigns. Nevertheless, this is not to argue that levels of intimidation and fear of past violence had diminished. Subtle psychological violence persisted with the ruling ZANU-PF drawing upon its power embedded within state agencies to intimidate and demonize the opposition.

### 3.2 Intra-party Violence

Although it has occurred on a more limited scale, intra-party violence is a blot on Zimbabwe's political system and culture. It suggests that competition for positions

and other resources is not only very intense but also divisive in political parties. It further suggests that mechanisms for dispute resolution and mediation are relatively underdeveloped in Zimbabwe's political parties. The resort to violence reflects a wider culture and tendency of intolerance and polarization. Both the governing ZANU-PF and the main opposition MDC Alliance have been plagued by intra-party violence at key turning points.

Intra-party violence in ZANU-PF was not as ferocious as that directed towards opposition parties. However, some of it was serious enough to warrant the setting up of a Board of Enquiry. This was the case with intra-party violence in 2004 in Makoni, eastern Zimbabwe, in which James Kaunye was stripped and assaulted leading to the arrest of 42 people. The Board of Enquiry investigated the violence between supporters of Didymus Mutasa (then party Secretary for Administration) and James Kaunye (provincial party contestant) during that primary election contest. While it was observed that the instigators of violence used youths as 'foot soldiers' (who were later prosecuted for perpetrating the violence), the party leaders were not held accountable for their role.

In another instance of internal party violence, a former governor of Masvingo, Josiah Hungwe, together with other ZANU-PF members were involved in a

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25. See ZHR NGO Forum, August 2004



skirmish between two factions during the provincial party elections in 2007.<sup>26</sup> Delegates attacked party leaders at that meeting with stones. Finally, an incident in Chegutu in 2005 epitomized a clash between ZANU-PF activists and state authorities over the exercise of power following an incident. Some 31 ZANU-PF youths destroyed property, assaulted members of the public, overran a police base and stabbed a police officer in retaliation for the arrest of their youth comrade.

The opposition MDC was not immune to the contagion of intraparty violence. The split of the party into MDC-T and MDC-Mutambara in 2005 ignited violence between the two factions. Prior to the split, the organizational response of the party to deepening repression had been the creation of a parallel structure within the MDC. However, the activities of the parallel structure not only resulted in major problems of violence and accountability in party structures but also became the central site of struggle for the control of the party between its president and

secretary-general.

Outbreaks of intra-party violence occurred intermittently in 2005 despite several party commissions set up to investigate and stop it. There was an alleged militia that was being used by unscrupulous party leaders against opponents. The youth were major actors mobilized by a section of the party leadership against opponents.

Intra-party violence tends to peak during primary elections or succession contests within parties. During the succession contest in ZANU-PF from 2014 to 2017, factional violence was prevalent often fanned by hate speech and scuffles. When the coup against the Mugabe administration took place in November 2017, some of the factional and state violence was directed towards leading party figures such as Ignatius Chombo, then party's Secretary for Administration and Kudzanai Chipanga, the party's Secretary for the Youth League and the properties of Saviour Kasukuwere, the party's Political Commissar and Jonathan

26. ZHRNGO Forum, April 2007



Moyo, a party's Politburo member were damaged. The latter reportedly escaped possible violence by a whisker.

In MDC-T, intra-party violence reached a new peak when the party split in 2014 into two party factions led by Tendai Biti and Elton Mangoma, and during the confrontation between party presidential contestants Nelson Chamisa and Thokozani Khupe in 2018. Much of early 2018 was consumed with a bitter struggle between the latter two for party presidency. Some of the ugly manifestations of internal party violence occurred during the funeral of Morgan Tsvangirai in February 2018. It was Khupe who was at the receiving end of most hate speech, threats and factional violence.

These patterns and examples of inter-party and intra-party violence demonstrate a worrying spread of a cancer of intolerance and violence that profoundly affected Zimbabwe's political culture. ZANU-PF was the major player and instigator, but MDC affiliated parties appeared to be imbibing this culture to the detriment of their original democratic ethos and practice.<sup>27</sup>

### 3.3 Torture

Torture against political opponents has been routinely used, particularly in election campaigns and post-election retribution. It consists of beatings, electric

shocks, harm to private parts and use of falanga torture (to inflict pain to soles of feet), amongst others. Perhaps the most symbolic torture session was the brutal beating of 'Save Zimbabwe' campaigners, including Morgan Tsvangirai, the MDC-T president and Lovemore Madhuku, the NCA leader, amongst others, in March 2007 in Harare. The graphic effects of the beatings were broadcast worldwide in a conjuncture in which technology escaped control and filtering of state censorship. Furthermore, the public display of the effects of torture was aimed at sending '*a message to all, a warning to others, and a lesson that authorities can humiliate anybody*'.<sup>28</sup>

As we will observe below, torture as a mode of punishment was not confined to political opponents. It was widely used against civil society activists such as students, trade unionists and women campaigners who stood up against authoritarianism. One professional report on 24 victims in 2007 observed that torture had devastating physical, psychological, and social health consequences.<sup>29</sup> The victims had continued to suffer from substantial and often debilitating physical and psychological symptoms as a direct result of abuse.

The evidence gathered on organized violence and torture (OVT) over the period 1998 to 2019 shows higher incidence in

27. See Jocelyn Alexander and Blessing-Miles Tendi, 2008

28. Quoted in Sachikonye, 2011:89; referring to Morgan Tsvangirai, it was Mugabe who stated "of course, he was bashed. He deserved it. I told the police to beat him a lot".

29. See OSISA, OSI and Bellevue/NYU Programme, 2007:3

2002, 2008, 2016 and 2019. Notably, these were election years (2002 and 2008) and years of strikes and protests (2016 and 2019). The peak year of violence was 2008, with over 15 000 incidents recorded by CSU alone.

### Box 1: Assault in Harare, 2019

*On 20th January 2019 around 0200 hours, I was assaulted by soldiers. They came looking for Keith who was not around. They started beating me asking for his whereabouts. I was beaten with batons, thick sticks, a whip and electric cables on my back, face and buttocks. They poured cold water over my body then I was forced to roll in the road for about 80m.*

*I was dunked in sewage then forced into their truck and they put a twine collar around my neck and tied it to the truck. The perpetrators stole my money \$20. I was taken to Dzivarasekwa Police Station. I was taken back home around 0500 hours.*

Source: CSU, 2019

**Table 1: New Incidents of Organized Violence and Torture (OVT) by Year and Gender of Victim: 1998 to May 2019**

Year of Incident	Female	Male	Total
1998	10	21	31
1999	1	8	9
2000	124	391	515
2001	99	339	438
2002	310	1108	1418
2003	161	487	648
2004	175	448	623
2005	233	364	597
2006	294	344	638
2007	446	820	1266
2008	5879	9557	15436
2009	151	328	479
2010	155	336	491
2011	184	526	710
2012	100	327	427
2013	211	371	582
2014	121	259	380
2015	160	362	522
2016	246	561	807
2017	138	386	524
2018	132	342	474
2019	322	574	896
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>9652</b>	<b>18259</b>	<b>27911</b>

Source: CSU, 2019

**Table 2: Provinces that experienced the highest levels of OVT as reported between 1998 and May 2019**

Provinces	No. of Reported Cases
Harare	7848
Manicaland	6911
Mashonaland Central	3713

Source: CSU, 2019

**Table 3: OVT by years with highest no. of cases reported between 1998 and May 2019**

Year	No. of Reported Cases
2002	1418
2007	1266
2008	15346
2016	807
2019	896

Source: CSU, 2019

**Table 4: Incidents of OVT Perpetrated by members of the Army reported between 1998 and May 2019**

Year of Incident	Female	Male	Total
1998	6	4	10
2000	2	18	20
2001	-	10	10
2002	21	77	98
2003	55	119	174
2004	7	18	25
2005	6	25	31
2006	2	11	13
2007	7	51	58
2008	371	916	1287
2009	20	28	48
2010	9	21	30
2011	12	31	43
2012	11	37	48
2013	5	29	34
2014	7	32	39
2015	6	29	35
2016	13	29	42
2017	11	63	74
2018	25	75	100
2019	270	441	711
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>866</b>	<b>2064</b>	<b>2930</b>

Source: CSU, 2019

### 3.4 Rape

Disturbingly, some political parties routinely use rape and other forms of sexual violence and abuse against their opponents. However, there is limited literature on the incidence of rape for various reasons. Despite considerable anecdotal reporting of rape and sexual violence since 2000, there has been little systematic documentation except that carried out by organizations such as CSU, Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition (CZC) and ZHR NGO Forum.<sup>30</sup> Part of the explanation relates to fear and stigma if the victims revealed their experiences. Even so, several reports between 2002 and 2005 provide details of gang rape of opposition women supporters.<sup>31</sup> This is one of the most despicable examples of abuse of women in Zimbabwe.

#### Box 2: A Gang Rape in Kariba, 2008

*On the 5th of July 2008, four men and a woman came to my house around 0100 hours and knocked at my door. The woman pretended to be my relative and I came out. I then discovered that she was not alone; the others had masks on their faces. The four men grabbed me and dragged me to their car and drove me to Wafawafa army base where I was confined to a room. The men accused me of being an MDC supporter responsible for calling meetings, which had led to the destruction of their party, Zanu-PF.*

*They left me there for a while and later two of them returned. They showed me guns in the room and walls splashed with blood and told me to cooperate or else they would kill me. They told me to choose from the two of them whom to have sex with and live, or if I refused, I would die. I conceded to have sex with them for the sake of my children and I was raped by four of them, taking turns to sleep with me until I lost consciousness.*

*After the incident, they drove me to Mahombekombe where they dumped me by the roadside. I was rescued by our Councilor who took me to my house. I narrated the whole ordeal to him. My husband had already escaped to Bulawayo. I had to stay with party members and in the bush until things had improved. I went to Zambia where I stayed for some time until the situation improved. Later I heard that my house was set on fire and some of my property looted. They also went to my rural home and when they failed to locate me they killed one of our cows to inflict pain on my mother. I have problems with my left leg, which sometimes gets numb.*

Source: CSU, 2008

30. See for example the report by ZHR NGO Forum in 2019, 'Burdened by Disgrace: an analysis of rape and sexual violence during the January 2019 protests...' CZC, 2010

31. See ZHR NGO Forum reports of Feb 2002, March 2002 and April 2005

It is vile that some of the rape and other forms of sexual abuse against women is revenge for their participation in politics or in campaigns by members of their family. For instance, about 56 per cent of a sample of female members of the NCA stated that they had been abused because a member of their family was involved in politics.<sup>32</sup> Women become victims both due to their involvement but also because of the involvement of others, and in the latter case, they are victimized to put pressure on their family members. This latter trend was particularly marked during the 2008 run-off election and during the 2019 shutdown strike.

### Box 3: Raped in Epworth, 2019

*On the 15th of January 2019 around 2000 hours, I was at home in Epworth with my husband when there was a knock at the door. They said they were soldiers. My husband opened the door and they beat him demanding money. He fled leaving me with 2 soldiers. They demanded money from me and I gave them \$1500 Bond that was for my husband's employer. One of them took the money and left. The other one demanded sex from me. I was scared and tried to remain standing near the wardrobe. He pushed me to the bed and forcefully removed my underwear. He raped me and stated that Chamisa also sleeps with married women so it was not a crime to do so. I went to BMC and ARC but I was only tested and never received any treatment.*

Source: CSU, 2019

It is vile that some of the rape and other forms of sexual abuse against women is revenge for their participation in politics or in campaigns by members of their family. For instance, about 56 per cent of a sample of female members of the NCA stated that they had been abused because a member of their family was involved in politics.<sup>33</sup> Women become victims both due to their involvement but also because of the involvement of others, and in the latter case, they are victimized to put pressure on their family members. This latter trend was particularly marked during the 2008 run-off election and during the 2019 shutdown strike.

**Table 5: Years in with the highest levels of female rapes reported during the period of 1998 to May 2019**

Year	No. of Reported Cases
2002	20
2008	467
2019	34

Source: CSU, 2019

32. RAU, 2009 quoted in Sachikonye, 2011:78

33. RAU, 2009 quoted in Sachikonye, 2011:78

**Table 6: Provinces with the highest levels of female rapes reported between 1998 and May 2019**

Province	No. of Reported Cases
Manicaland	187
Mashonaland West	97
Mashonaland Central	95

Source: CSU, 2019

**Table 7: Reported New Incidents of Rape by year and Gender of Victim, 1998 to May 2019**

Year of Incident	Female	Male	Total
2000	7	2	9
2001	8	-	8
2002	20	4	24
2003	7	-	7
2004	8	1	9
2005	1	1	2
2006	1	-	1
2007	11	3	14
2008	467	64	531
2009	4	-	4
2010	1	2	3
2011	4	1	5
2012	3	-	3
2013	6	1	7
2014	-	1	1
2015	-	1	1
2016	2	3	5
2017	-	1	1
2018	2	2	4
2019	34	-	34
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>586</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>673</b>

Source: CSU, 2019

A CZC report provided profiles of women activists who have experienced the trauma of violence in the form of rape.<sup>34</sup> In unrelenting detail, it describes gang rape allegedly by soldiers and other agents against women activists in opposition parties and CSOs (see also Boxes 3 and 4 above). Particularly vulnerable to such situations of violence and abuse, women are taken advantage of because they are physically weaker, an attribute that party youth, state agents and militia take advantage of. It is notable, however, that rape and sexual abuse of male activists have been on the rise, as shown by the data in Table 7 above. Significantly, most rapes seemed to be concentrated in the three provinces of

34. See *Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition*, 2010

Manicaland, Mashonaland West and Mashonaland Central as Table 6 illustrates. The deliberate assault on the opposition movement was more intense in those provinces.

### 3.5 Abductions

In September 2019, a leader of striking junior doctors, Dr Magombe, was abducted in Harare. Owing to the large national and international outcry, he was released but in a heavily drugged state some 6 days later outside the city. Activists like Patrick Nabanyama abducted in 2000, Paul Chizuze in 2012 and Italic Dzamara in 2015 have not been found since. Some 617 persons were abducted during the 2000 election campaign.<sup>35</sup> Abduction is an old and crude weapon that has been applied against those who have opposed the state or ruling elite at a particular time. The list goes back to the 1970s with the abduction of Dr Edison Sithole by colonial state agents.

**Table 8: Reported Incidents of OVT Abduction by year and Gender of Victim: between 1998 and May 2019**

Year of Incident	Female	Male	Total
1998	1	-	1
2000	16	87	103
2001	15	78	93
2002	54	257	311
2003	17	66	83
2004	25	66	91
2005	9	37	46
2006	10	9	19
2007	17	102	119
2008	1869	3561	5430
2009	14	37	51
2010	12	24	36
2011	14	70	84
2012	4	25	29
2013	12	31	43
2014	2	16	18
2015	7	25	32
2016	4	24	28
2017	2	32	34
2018	2	19	21
2019	15	134	149
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>2121</b>	<b>4700</b>	<b>6821</b>

Source: CSU, 2019

35. See David Coltart, 2016:287



## Box 4: Abduction of a child and family in Chitungwiza, 2019

*On the 23rd of January 2019, I was abducted by some men in plain clothes. They came to our home and inquired of my father's whereabouts. I told them that I did not know. They forced us into their car and to go call out father and inform him of the abduction.*

*My father came out of hiding and we were released, my brothers and I. I witnessed the men assaulting my father. They took him away and when I saw him later, he was covered in blood.*

Source: Counselling Services Unit (CSU), 2019

Abductions of opposition party workers and members, activists such as student leaders and unionists and even journalists have been used to penalise and cripple their activities during the period under study. Abductions are often conducted in the dark by shadowy figures and institutions believed to be connected to state agencies.<sup>36</sup> Torture is often applied to abductees. Abduction has a disorientating and humiliating effect on those abducted. Aimed at disabling activists, abductions are used as a deliberate weapon to send a message to other activists or members in a movement or organization. The practice of abduction is, of course, contemptuous disregard of the rule of law. Table 8 below shows the trends in abduction during the period from 1998 to 2019. The peaks in the abduction were in 2000, 2002, 2008 and very worryingly another jump occurred in 2019. These years coincided with election campaigns and the shutdown in 2019.

## Box 5: Abduction and Sodomy in Banket, 2008

*In 2008 I used to live with my aunt who was a well-known MDC activist. In June 2008 a group of Zanu-PF youths came looking for her. She was not at home at the time and I tried to explain to them that she was out of town but they did not believe me. I was the oldest of all the children who were there. I was assaulted all over the body especially the head with baton sticks. They tied my hands and legs together and they continued assaulting me. They forced me to go with them to the base and they said they were going to detain me until they found her. My aunt was taken to the base and was detained for one and a half weeks. I was sodomized repeatedly by four men over the period. They continued assaulting me while I was detained at the base. I was assaulted with baton sticks, metal objects and they poured cold water on me. They threatened to kill me if I told anyone what had happened at the base.*

Banket, Zvimba

Source: CSU, 2008

36. See Mukoko, 2016; and Moyo, 2019

**Table 9: Years in which the highest number of abductions reported, 1998-May 2019**

Year	No. of Reported Cases
2000	103
2002	311
2007	119
2008	5430
2019	149

Source: CSU, 2019

There have been no thorough investigations on who carries out abductions. As we have already observed, the practice goes back to the colonial state era and the Gukurahundi period. Even where abductions result in the disappearance and suspected death, the state has not been known to be unrelenting in its investigations as the case of Itai Dzamara illustrates. It is in high profile instances such as in the abduction of Jestina Mukoko and Dr Peter Magombei that the shadowy agencies or individuals are compelled to release their victims. It is nonetheless revealing that state prosecution of those who carried out abductions is not executed. In his 2019 book, Jonathan Moyo saw a pattern and a hidden hand behind the serial abductions.<sup>37</sup> These unresolved abductions are an ample testimony of the impunity enjoyed by those who carry them out.

### 3.6 Repression of CSOs

Most accounts of political violence tend to lump civil society organizations (CSOs) and opposition parties together. This would be misleading. Most CSOs have a measure of autonomy. On the whole, however, CSOs operating in the governance and human rights sector have been ‘*soft targets*’ to state authoritarianism state during the period under review.<sup>38</sup>

Since 1998, most violence has targeted labour unions, professional associations of teachers and students. National organizations such as the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, the Progressive Teachers’ Union of Zimbabwe (PTUZ), the Amalgamated Rural Teachers’ Union of Zimbabwe (ARTUZ) and the Zimbabwe National Students’ Union (ZINASU) have been principal targets of state repression.

Other groups that have attracted the wrath of the authoritarian state over the decades are independent newspapers and individual journalists, resident associations, demonstrators, as well as pressure groups such as the National Constitutional Assembly

37. See Moyo, 2019:57: “in all these cases, there is no accountability whatsoever because JOC elements are a law to themselves...” he observes.

38. This part of the section partly draws from Sachikonye, 2011: 68-74

(NCA) and Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA). Due to their criticism of state repression as well as periodic marches, members and leaders of these pressure groups have been targets of institutionalized violence. More generally, NGOs that are involved in governance and human rights campaigns have been subjected to surveillance, harassment, and even detention and violence.

There was a sustained campaign against the ZCTU from 1999 following the formation of the MDC. First, there were incidents in which state violence was directed at unionists protesting at working conditions. Morgan Tsvangirai who led the ZCTU between the late 1980s and 2000 was at the receiving end of some of the violence in 1997 and 2007. In 2001, two workers were shot dead and 22 injured by gunshots, tear gas and beatings from the police when 4 000 workers went on strike at the ZISCO steel company in Redcliff. In 2009, police used disproportionate force including gunshots and tear gas against striking workers at the Shabani mine in Midlands province.

A Commission of Enquiry set up by the International Labour Organization (ILO) gathered first-hand evidence in 2009 and made the most detailed assessment of violence directed against the labour movement. It concluded that there was a systematic, even systemic, violation of ILO Conventions such as freedom of association and a clear pattern of arrests, detention and torture of labour leaders and members by security forces coinciding with ZCTU nationwide events, indicating some centralized direction to take such action.<sup>39</sup>

### Box 6: Torture of a Labour Leader in Harare, 2006

*On marching from Construction House in Harare, where some unions rent offices, we were arrested immediately and driven to Matapi police station. But the police did not tell us what was going to happen. On arrival, we were separated from each other. We later heard the noise of people being beaten, and we initially thought that it was thieves being lashed.*

*Then the police came and started beating each one of us in pairs with sticks. For the first time in my life, I saw that you can sweat from being beaten. I then lost consciousness from the beatings. Two young officers beat me again after I had revived. I was forced to lie down while they stepped on my neck as they continued with the beating. I could not see more than 3 metres away. I could hardly move, let alone walk or hear.*

*I then felt very thirsty. I was ordered to go to another side of the station despite my*

39. See ILO Report, 2009; See also Sachikonye, Raftopoulos and Kanyenze, 2018.

*intense pain. Meanwhile, my colleague's head was cut from the beating. My backside was very painful and I could hardly turn my body. For 48 hours, they did not allow us access to medicine or our lawyers...*

*I have never been beaten like that in my whole life...*

*Source: Field Interview with ZCTU Leader, Lovemore Matombo, February 2010*

The culmination of state repression against labour was in the form of torture directed at its leadership in September 2006. During a peaceful protest against poverty and high taxes, a large number of labour unionists were arrested, detained and assaulted at nine locations throughout the country. When torture was applied to male and female labour leaders at the Matapi police station, the effects were so severe that they required of hospital treatment (see Box 6).<sup>40</sup> Draconian treatment of union leaders was repeated during the shutdown strikes of 2016 and 2019.

There are numerous examples of how intimidation and violence has been directed at groups such as the youth, women and students. They have been extensively covered elsewhere.<sup>41</sup> However, some general observations can be made. In the period 2018-2019, there was a resurgence of systematic repression of these groups with the increasing resort to detentions, trumped-up charges and heavy-handed state response to protests. State intolerance to dissent has surged during the period 2016 to 2019. As resistance appears to have spread to informal sector associations such as vendors' and taxi drivers associations, the state has applied more draconian measures against CSOs.



40. Box is reproduced from Sachikonye, 2011:70.

41. For instance, repression of student organizations is detailed in a study by Hodgkinson, 2014 on 'ZINASU, State Violence and Frustrated Masculinity, 2000-2008'.

### 3.7 State Responses

The response of state institutions to political dissent and economic-related protests has, on the whole, not been proportionate. In exhibiting authoritarian tendencies, the state has used heavy-handed tactics and measures against the opposition, CSOs and protest groups. Retrogressively, there has been a steady drift towards utilization of state institutions such as Police and Intelligence for partisan purposes during election campaigns and in other forms of contests between the ruling and opposition parties. From 2000, the scale and frequency of partisanship became more pronounced. Murders, injury and intimidation of opposition members tended to be ignored by state institutions such as the Police and Intelligence organizations. In addition, where they were implicated, these institutions were protected by formal and informal impunity.

The state itself created other organizations trained in the administration of political indoctrination, intimidation and violence. These were militia whose recruiting ground were trainees from national service (Border Gezi) training camps as well as some war veterans. Drawn predominantly from youths in their teens, national service camps imparted indoctrination that extolled the pre-eminence of ZANU-PF in the liberation struggle and government.

The indoctrination painted opposition parties and CSOs as 'sell-outs' and

'Western puppets'. Having stripped them of their legitimacy and humanity as well as rights, the opposition was seen as 'fair game' for hounding, beating and torturing during election campaigns.

“ Drawn predominantly from youths in their teens, national service camps imparted indoctrination that extolled the pre-eminence of ZANU-PF in the liberation struggle and government.

In the decades between 1998 to 2019, the scale and type of technology used for control and repression had considerably grown in sophistication. Surveillance on a large scale was enabled. Advanced technology was used to intercept mails, phone calls and Internet traffic of the opposition and CSOs: at key moments during protests in 2016 and 2019, an Internet blackout was effected to paralyze social media and news transmission.

The consequences for Zimbabwean society of the embedded violence within state institutions and their transformation into partisan structures has been enormous and will be felt for many years to come.

Finally, the Zimbabwean state has a notable tendency towards the disproportionate use of force against protesters even when they are peaceful.

The frequent use of beatings and shootings has occurred during demonstrations in the period under review. Perhaps the most prominent and tragic use of such disproportionate force occurred in August 2018 during a post-election protest. The findings of the Motlanthe Commission on the violence that occurred on that day are self-explanatory.<sup>42</sup>

The Commission observed that *“the use of live ammunition directed at people especially when they were fleeing is unjustified and disproportionate. The use of sjamboks, baton sticks and rifle butts to assault members of the public was also disproportionate”*.<sup>43</sup> Significantly, some of the key recommendations made by the Commission on how Zimbabwe’s security agencies should handle protests were

that:

- The use of the military to assist the Police for the control of public order is recognized worldwide but this should only be resorted to as a last measure in extraordinary situations; and that
- The military should conduct an immediate and full audit of its standing orders and procedures for engagement in law and order enforcement including riot control.<sup>44</sup>

None of the recommendations have been implemented at the moment of writing of this report in early 2020. This fact relates to the non-accountability of the soldiers who shot the street protesters and imperious need for a comprehensive re-training and re-orientation of Zimbabwe’s security agencies to banish their reputation of brutality and beneficiaries of impunity.

“ In exhibiting authoritarian tendencies, the state has used heavy-handed tactics and measures against the opposition, CSOs and protest groups.

42. See the Motlanthe Commission report, 2018

43. *ibid.*

44. *ibid.*



## VIOLENCE IN RESOURCE CONFLICTS

Political competition and power struggles are only some of the factors behind violence in Zimbabwe. Lying beneath and fueling some of these struggles are conflicts over resources. These conflicts have festered over decades, and an absence of the rule of law has worsened such conflicts with some degenerating into violence. The decades between 1998 and 2019 witnessed acute conflicts over several resources, primarily related to land, minerals and economic spaces.

A process of coercive accumulation or '*accumulation by dispossession*' has been occurring accompanied by intermittent violence and its political dimension. The ruling elites took advantage of openings, including '*economic empowerment*', to amass a lion's share of the wealth. In the accumulation process, the rule of law and transparency has been trampled amidst flaring of conflicts.

### 4.1 Land Conflicts

The land reform in the 2000s was far from a peaceful and orderly process. Enormous capital was reaped by deploying violence to expropriate farms and to hammer MDC opposition supporters into 'submission'. The violence perpetrated between 2000 and 2003 was unparalleled in its dual character: social violence to disown white farmers, and political violence to cow opposition supporters residing on the farms. This was the context in which the key players were Robert Mugabe, representing his party and state and Chenjerai Hunzvi, leading war veterans, shared in the spoils. Although land seizures were cast in ideological terms, there was no doubt that the huge amount of patronage capital amassed and distributed purchased some votes. This was the sub-text of land reform that Mugabe exploited to camouflage violence on the farms.





One vehicle to implement the land reform process was termed '*Operation Tsuru*'.<sup>45</sup> The first dimension of this Operation was that of 'command and control' directed by a coordinated group from the Police, the CIO, war veterans and the Ministry of Information and Publicity.

This group met for regular briefings to discuss the direction of the land take-over or jambanja. The second dimension was the setting of 'operational zones', established to identify 'loyal' and 'opposition' zones and communities with the aim of converting them into 'liberated' pro-ZANU-PF zones. While the 'loyal' zones were rewarded, the 'opposition' zones were punished. The third dimension was 'ground troops', consisting of land-hungry peasants (armed with farming implements such as picks and axes) led by war veterans with the state acting as the armorer. Operation Tsuru thus deployed both the carrot of land and the stick of violence. By the beginning of June 2000, about 30 opposition supporters and 10 farmers had been killed and thousands of farms designated for redistribution. The violence had been carefully calculated: as one analyst observed, *"looking back, the calculation of violence - as much as the violence itself - is what chills. People who died were considered so many cyphers in a cold-blooded campaign conducted on several levels"*.<sup>46</sup>

The violence left a permanent scar on the rural political landscape. For instance, it was observed that one in ten farmworkers surveyed in 2009 reported at least one murder amongst fellow farmworkers. Some 38 per cent of the sampled respondents noted that children on farms had been forced to watch public beatings or other forms of torture.<sup>47</sup> Significantly, about 75 per cent of respondents also confirmed that they had experienced intimidation under Operation Makavoterapapi, which the military and militia used against the MDC in the 2008 run-off election. Thus, the former and present farmworker population is one of the traumatized social groups in Zimbabwean society.

There still has been no finality to Zimbabwe's land question. Periodic land invasions that sometimes spill into violence still occur as it did in the Mazowe, Chipinge, Chiredzi and Harare South districts. Land dispute settlement machinery is weak or non-existent compounding festering and open conflicts. Similarly worrying are urban-based land conflicts that flare up in such areas as Harare South, Epworth and Hopley amongst others. The conflicts have been serious enough to warrant the creation in 2018 of a Commission of Enquiry into Urban Land.<sup>48</sup>

45. See Chitiyo, 2003

46. Chan, 2003:158

47. See a study by GAPWUZ, 2010:21-22

48. See the Summary and Presentation of Commission Chairperson, Justice Tendai Uchena, to the President of the Republic of Zimbabwe, Commission of Inquiry into the Matter of Sale of State Land in and around Urban Areas since 2005, 9 December 2019

## 4.2 Conflicts and Violence in Mining

The decade beginning 2020 has opened with regular reports of grisly violence by mining syndicates and gangs often known as MaShurugwi. The derisive term refers to the original geographical origin of small gold miners in the Midlands who operate in gangs that exploit mining claims using force and unlawful means. These notorious gangs traverse not only the Midlands but also to Matabeleland South, Mashonaland West and Mashonaland Central, almost everywhere that the precious metal is to be found.

Yet the beginnings of small or artisanal mining in the 2000s were relatively modest with minimal conflict. Originally known as ‘gold panners’ and later as ‘makorokoza’, these small miners eked a livelihood on the margins of land reform and informal economy. Changes in land ownership patterns increased, indeed necessitated, the scale of involvement in off-farm activities particularly artisanal mining to supplement incomes. One study observed that in the wake of droughts and lack of farming inputs, artisanal mining became the only viable alternative for newly resettled farmers and some farmworkers.<sup>49</sup> As the prices received from delivery gold, and later diamonds, increased, the numbers of small miners swelled in the mid-2000s.

With the potential of money to be made from staking mining claims and subcontracting the small miners, politicians, business, and military figures waded into the sector. Hence, the transformation of the sector into control by this elite occurred. Some ZANU-PF politicians and military officers played a crucial role in controlling this artisanal mining not only in gold but also diamonds in Marange in the 2000s.

The lucrativeness of returns from gold and diamonds was enhanced by payment in foreign currency and through smuggling. One estimate was that up to half a million people were engaged in mining in the Midlands, and about 20 000 in Marange in the 2000s.<sup>50</sup>

It was not long before conflicts over mining claims flared up. Violence was one dimension of that conflict. Frequent clashes between mining syndicates and gangs resulted in deaths and injuries. The most violent confrontation was that in 2008 in Marange when state security used

49. Showers Mawowa, 2014:920.

50. Ibid. “Field observations and interviews reveal that groups of miners in syndicates do not always work as equals. What appears to be a loose coalition of miners is often linked to and supported by well-to-do and often powerful political or business person referred to as a ‘sponsor’, ‘shedu’ or ‘vakuru’. The ‘sponsor’ can take 50 per cent of received gold, while the other is shared equally among miners. Some syndicates are thus no more than employees of a ‘sponsor’, whose connection to state coercive apparatus provides protection from both political harassment and rival groups...”

lethal force include airpower against miners resulting in about 200 deaths. Significantly, this paved the way for diamond companies including one partly owned by Zimbabwe's military to move in and exploit the mineral. In the Midlands, a syndicate with close links to ZANU-PF leaders began to dominate in gold mining.

The intense competition in the informal mining sector after 2015 degenerated into turf wars and criminality in the Midlands, Mashonaland West, and Mashonaland Central provinces. The scramble for gold has become intertwined with politics to the extent that some powerful politicians allegedly provide cover and an umbrella of impunity to the MaShurugwi.<sup>51</sup>

### Box 7: Terror Gangs in the Mining Sector, 2019

*Between August and October 2019, some 105 cases of murder have been recorded in mining areas surrounding Kadoma while 221 cases of assault have been recorded. This indicates that there is a marked increase in lawlessness in the area with innocent citizens suffering at the hands of mining gangs...*

*This is further exacerbated by the fact that the gangs seem to be enjoying impunity as most of them continue without being arrested...*

*Source: ZPP, October 2019*

As one report observed in October 2019, artisanal mining 'terror groups' wreaked havoc in the Mashonaland West province, especially in Kadoma, with machete attacks being reported almost every day.<sup>52</sup> As Box 7 explains, conflicts in gold mining areas have morphed into rampant lawlessness largely due to impunity imparted by and provided by powerful politicians in the ruling party. Conflicts in mining are being felt in the wider political arena as Box 8 shows.

### Box 8: Political Consequences of Mining Violence, 2020

*Zimbabwe ran the risk of creating a deadly militia that will cause bloodbath and target opposition members during the 2023 elections if the machete-wielding gangs are not brought to book.*

*As one civil society leader remarked: there is a high risk that the gangs will try to protect their mines in the lead up to the 2023 elections as any threat to their source of livelihood would be met with violence...*

51. See Human Rights Watch, 2009, and T. Nyamunda and P. Mukwambo, 2012.

52. Zimbabwe Peace Project monthly report, October 2019.

*Because they are aligned to parties and powerful politicians, there is a danger that we are creating a militia that will be abused for political processes, especially around elections...Given the fact that we have had violent elections in the past, we now have a phenomenon where people walk armed and can use those weapons against citizens to defend their bosses.<sup>53</sup>*

*Source: Mutongwizo, 2020*

In sum, what began as a conflict over access to mines has now spiraled into a security and political conflict. State institutions and political parties have become embroiled in the far-reaching conflicts. Through their complicity and immunity, state institutions and the ruling party have exacerbated the conflict. One parliamentarian aptly summed up that the proliferation of the conflict had become “*a threat to national security, the security of persons, business security and property security*”.<sup>54</sup> National leadership and political will have been absent in addressing this spiraling conflict.

### 4.3 Contests Over Economic Spaces

The conflicts over land and minerals have spilt over into urban spaces. Party-linked militia and other groups have engaged in conflicts over the access to urban resources like space for stalls and flea markets, housing, taxi ranks and long-distance bus terminus. There have also been contests over jobs and other opportunities in cities and towns in a polarized environment. While the opposition holds power in local councils and municipalities on one hand, the ruling ZANU-PF wields state power through its control of central government institutions on the other. Collisions of interest often occur. More significantly, the ruling party has been linked to militia groups like the Chipangano in the Mbare suburb in Harare and has used the groups as conduits of its exercise of authority and penetration often through violence or threat of it.

We can draw from the findings of one detailed study on how the militia creates strongholds even in opposition-controlled cities and towns.<sup>55</sup> For instance, the Chipangano was notorious for hijacking council property, markets, and functions in Mbare. Not only was it involved in physical violence, but Chipangano also invested in low-tech surveillance to foster compliance and quell resistance. This entailed the compiling of lists of names, keeping registers of attendance at ZANU-PF events, making regular demands for party cards, and keeping a close watch on opposition activists.<sup>56</sup> Established in 2001, with its patron believed to be a senior ZANU-PF politician, Jasper Savanhu,

53. L. Mutongwizo, 10 January 2020, quoting Douglas Mahiya in 263 Chat

54. Brian Dube as quoted in the Standard, 20 October 2019.

55. See McGregor, 2014

56. *ibid.*

Chipangano developed a fearsome reputation due to its coercive methods and economic tentacles. Its model was replicated in similar groups that were subsequently set up in Epworth and Harare South.

Such militia was used to generate income for ZANU-PF supporters and maintain partisan access to urban resources like council housing, trading hubs, vending space, home industry areas, amongst other resources.<sup>57</sup> Conflicts flared between the opposition-held suburbs and the militia to the detriment of economic progress and local peace.

“ While the opposition holds power in local councils and municipalities on one hand, the ruling ZANU-PF wields state power through its control of central government institutions on the other.

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<sup>57.</sup> *ibid.*

## BREAKING THE CYCLES

### Conclusion and Recommendations

#### 5.1 Cycles of Violence

This Report has examined trends and evidence on politically related violence during the two decades between 1998 and 2019. One of its main conclusions is that cycles of violence take place periodically in Zimbabwe. The peaks of these cycles tend to be marked by elections (as in 2000, 2002, 2008 and 2018) and periods of economic distress that spark protests and strikes (as in 1998, 2006, 2016 and 2019). Each of these peaks has tended to witness increased repression. In between these cycles, there are festering resource conflicts that also flare into violence around land redistribution such as in 2000 to 2003 and in mining such as from 2007 to 2009, and again from 2015 to the present. These recurrent cycles have caused immeasurable trauma in the Zimbabwean society.

In particular, the Report observed disturbing trends in internal party violence that again reaches a peak during primary elections. Major parties like ZANU-PF and the MDC, and its later offshoots MDC-T and MDC-Alliance have been arenas of this intra-party violence. Factionalism has also been another cause of outbreaks of violence. Although intra-party violence has not reached the scale of the inter-party clashes, it remains a disturbing trend. A political culture that encourages and tolerates violence has become embedded in most political parties. This is worrying.

The central role of state institutions in exacerbating this violence has been examined at considerable length in each of the chapters. The evidence relating to security institutions' treatment of opposition parties, CSOs like trade unions and human rights organizations and independent media shows a disturbing trend of draconian repression. The use of such tools as abduction and rape has been appalling. Their prevalence during periods of strikes and 'shutdowns' has been extensively documented. An exacerbating factor is the tendency of state-related institutions like the police and military to display partisan tendencies.





In addition, this Report showed that other equally disturbing trends in violence have been experienced in conflicts over resources. As the economic crisis has deepened as demonstrated by high levels of unemployment, thousands if not millions have sought to eke livelihoods on land and in mines. Due to scarcity of these resources, conflicts have flared up and sometimes erupted into violence. Politicians and authorities that are engaged in accumulation in these sectors fuel some of these conflicts. To that extent, the conflicts have a political dimension.

Finally, the Report explored the phenomenon of party-linked urban groups that use violence to grab opportunities such as market space, rentals, and accommodation. Force, intimidation, and threats were used to ring-fence those assets and opportunities. This ominous trend illustrates the additional dynamics of violence during the period under study.

## 5.2 Recommendations

### 5.2.1 To Political Parties

This Report has established the strong connection between elections and the rise of violence. Presently, electoral laws seem ineffective in deterring political parties from engaging in inter-party as well as intra-party violence. There have been no penalties applied against party campaigners who use 'hate language', intimidation and violence. There is, therefore, need for stronger electoral laws

that are effectively used as a deterrent against politically related violence.

*Parties should take responsibility to educate and discipline their supporters in issues of inter-party conflicts including violence. They should exert pressure on relevant Commission and state institutions involved in electoral matters to expedite issues relating to reducing conflict in the electoral process.*

In times of economic stress, the recruitment of youth into political parties might be one of the few available avenues to earning a livelihood however temporary. While they feature prominently in violence, they are not the original 'brainchild' of these activities. Instead, they are 'foot soldiers' recruited by party leaders, state institutions and war veterans.

As we observed in the Report, thousands of them were recruited for indoctrination and paramilitary training in 'Border Gezi' camps and other institutions. *Efforts must be made to rehabilitate such youth who committed abuses and develop programs that provide alternative sources of livelihoods and training sessions to enhance their skills training. Political parties have a special responsibility to avoiding the exploitation of youth and women as a tactic to secure their positions of power.*

Ultimately, the findings of this Report

show the intricate involvement of some political parties and state institutions in the cycles of violence. Ultimately the issue is not simply a law and order issue and partisanship but that can only be solved through a broad national dialogue leading to an inclusive political settlement. *Political parties should actively participate in that search for a lasting political settlement that establishes a framework for a peaceful resolution of political and economic challenges.*

### 5.2.2 To Civil Society Organizations

There is already an impressive and courageous work being carried out in gathering material on politically related abuses and violence. This is the core of the work of organizations such as ZHR NGO Forum, Zimbabwe Peace Project, Counseling Services Unit and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights. Their contributions are pivotal in building a complete picture of the past and current state of human rights in Zimbabwe.

However, while an extensive database of human rights violations is already in existence, the challenge remains in the need to conduct an in-depth analysis of that material to establish links and patterns in violence. Capacity should be developed to update and analyze the material for multiple purposes, including advocacy and lobbying campaigns. The database should be accessible to interested stakeholders such as counseling units, rehabilitation centers, research units, other human rights

organisations, advocacy and welfare groups. Statistics on violence should be interpreted and woven into powerful messages against the established culture of impunity.

Knowledge, analysis, and lessons from the database should be utilized in pragmatic ways. Not only should they be used for legal and academic purposes, but also, they should be drawn upon to improve the health and psychological conditions of victims and as an advocacy tool to improve access to justice. What is imperative is to link the database to imaginative, well-informed, and effective public campaigns against specific abuses such as torture, human rights transgressions, any forms of gender-based violence political rape and impunity. The value of a comprehensive and continually updated database is priceless.

### 5.2.3 To the Independent Commissions

#### ▪ Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC)

Some of the election-related violence relates not only to campaign-related but also post-election outbreaks of violence over delays in the announcement of results. Such was the case in the 2018 election. In a context of constant improvements in information and communications technologies (ICTs) and the ability to display local results almost live, any delay that lasts for more than a day provides fodder for speculation and

throws a shadow of doubt over the validity of the results.

*There should be swift announcement of results once the counting process has been completed. The experiences of Botswana and South Africa, both SADC member states, are worthy emulating to forestall violence stemming from anxieties and suspicions over delays. In this respect, the Motlanthe Commission in 2018 was quite clear: “there should be an expeditious transmission of results to the election Command Center as soon as practicable. Parliament should consider adopting legislation to shorten the time taken in the announcement of presidential results in future elections”.<sup>58</sup>*

#### ▪ Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC)

While an extensive database of human rights violations is already in existence, the challenge remains in the need to conduct an in-depth analysis of that material to establish links and patterns in violence. Capacity should be developed to update and analyze the material for multiple purposes, including advocacy and campaigns. The database should be accessible to interested stakeholders such as counseling units, rehabilitation centers, research units, other human rights organisations, advocacy groups and welfare groups. Statistics on violence should be interpreted and woven into powerful messages against the culture of impunity.

“Capacity should be developed to update and analyze the material for multiple purposes, including advocacy and campaigns.”



58. See Motlanthe Commission report, 2018:51

A large part of the explanation for the different cycles of institutionalized violence is found in the immunity enjoyed by those who commit it. This has resulted in perpetrators not being called to account for their actions such as torture, maiming, murder and rape.

## ▪ National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC)

Many cases of trauma and scars exist as a consequence of the violence, injuries, rape, abductions, displacement and other losses described in this Report. Both physical and psychological injuries take a long time to heal. In addition, a great deal of fear exists in various strata of society as a result of experiencing and hearing about violence and threats thereof. In some instances, those traumatic experiences go back to the *Gukurahundi* era while in others are associated with the various election-related disturbances or resource conflicts.

*Given the huge scale of such trauma that has been experienced and carried for many years, there should also be counseling and treatment on a large scale. The NPRC has a special role to play as the relevant Commission. While some institutions such as CSU already provide these services, these are on a limited scale and so they require significant support and upscaling.*

*There should be a concerted stepping up of such support for children, youth, women, and men who have been affected by the violence, intimidation and injuries of the decade 1998 to 2019, but also since Independence. The healing and reconciliation process is a broad one under other auspices, but there should be coordination between all institutions involved in the provision of counseling, treatment, and rehabilitation. Settlement mechanisms should be established to*

*address the conflicts that arise. The relevant courts should prosecute cases of corruption vigorously.*

A large part of the explanation for the different cycles of institutionalized violence is found in the immunity enjoyed by those who commit it. This has resulted in perpetrators not being called to account for their actions such as torture, maiming, murder and rape.

Since the culture of impunity lies at the core of cycles of violence, it needs to be confronted and broken. This means executing deep reforms within those state institutions that are part of the structures of impunity.

Those individuals and institutions that commit abuses should be prosecuted in courts and be required to account for damages caused. Government must implement the recommendations of the Motlanthe Commission report of 2018.

Cumulatively, the findings of this Report show the intricate involvement of some political parties and state institutions in the cycles of violence. Ultimately the issue is not simply a law and order issue and partisanship but one that can only be solved through a broad national dialogue leading to an inclusive political settlement.

Government together with political parties should actively search for a lasting political settlement that establishes a framework for a peaceful resolution of political and economic challenges.



### 5.2.5 To the Judiciary

Since the culture of impunity lies at the core of cycles of violence, it needs to be confronted and broken. This means executing deep reforms within those state institutions that are part of the structures of impunity. Those individuals and institutions that commit abuses should be prosecuted in courts and be required to account for damages caused.

The commission of abuses must be costly for the perpetrator; a high price in terms of privation of liberty and compensation is therefore due. As the Motlanthe Commission recommended in 2018, those who commit excesses such as the use of live ammunition on unarmed citizens should be made accountable, and there should be compensation for losses and damages, and support for close families of the deceased.

### 5.2.4 To Government

This report showed that most resource conflicts are politicized. Some of the conflicts have degenerated into lawlessness and violence. Some political parties, political leaders and state institutions are beneficiaries of resources such as land and minerals and play a pivotal role in the substantiation of these conflicts.

An approach that recognizes the material roots and political dimensions of resource conflicts has potential merit in resolving the conflicts.

Ingredients of resolution of the since violence tends to peak during elections, the role of Electoral Courts must become pivotal, especially during election processes.

Those individuals and institutions that commit abuses should be prosecuted in courts and be required to account for damages caused. The commission of abuses must be costly for the perpetrator.

*The Judiciary must follow up on the Motlanthe Commission recommendation ensuring that those who committed excesses such as the use of live ammunition on unarmed citizens are made accountable. There should be compensation for victims.*<sup>59</sup>

### 5.2.6 To Security Institutions

As the Report argued, the impunity enjoyed by the military, intelligence, and police in the course of their duties has historically hampered access to justice and compensation by those wrongfully arrested, maimed and killed during campaigns, protests and elections. The principal reason why impunity has prevailed ever since independence is that these forces have been deeply partisan. Ideological outlook, recruitment, and promotion practices in the three security forces have been partisan with ZANU-PF requiring their unabated loyalty.

Ultimately, these forces do the bidding of a state dominated by ZANU-PF. In practice,

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<sup>59</sup>. *ibid.*

instead of being founded and run on professional and non-partisan lines, these forces are subordinate to the ruling party.

The three forces are a major component of what has sometimes been termed a 'deep state'. Although there was an attempt under the GNU to introduce security sector reforms covering the three forces, there was deep resistance from the forces.<sup>60</sup> *This should not discourage renewed attempts at reform of these forces. Such reform should be premised on strict adherence to the provisions of the 2013 Constitution that spells out that the forces should be impartial and professional.* Although this goes against the ideology and history of relations between ZANU-PF political leadership and security forces, that break is necessary to build neutral and professionally run forces. Otherwise, the partisanship of the forces will continue to create similar problems, including military intervention, as have occurred in the past.

Furthermore, the conduct of police during demonstrations, protests and strike is known to be very heavy-handed. The style of policing that has been variously described as brutal and panicky should give way to a more measured and confident approach that relies on minimal force. There should be extensive retraining of the police in the handling of domestic situations of protests, riots and demonstrations.

“ *As the Motlanthe Commission recommended in 2018, those who commit excesses such as the use of live ammunition on unarmed citizens should be made accountable, and there should be compensation for losses and damages, and support for close families of the deceased.* ”

60. K. Chitiyo and S. Kibble, 2014



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